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Does the informational role of the Annual General Meeting depend on a country’s legal tradition? 
 
Abstract: 
The annual general meeting (AGM) constitutes the most important corporate event. Nevertheless, its role as an 
efficient instrument for corporate governance has recently come under increasing scrutiny, and numerous 
proposals for reform have emerged as a result. The purpose of this paper is to assess the release of value-
relevant information during the AGM by analysing its impact on returns, returns volatility, and trading 
volumes in a sample of common- and civil-law countries. In one of the most influential articles in the field of 
corporate governance, La Porta et al. (1998) examine the relationship between legal systems and shareholder 
protection. Given the importance of a country’s legal tradition regarding not only shareholders’ rights but also 
the role they play in the company, we cannot assume on a prior basis that results obtained in countries in which 
the legal tradition is based on the common law, like the U.S. and the U.K., can be directly extrapolated to 
countries with different legal traditions. Our results emphasise the role of national idiosyncratic characteristics 
among the civil-law countries analysed and show a very close relationship to the AGM in common-law 
countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we focus our attention on a main mechanism that, at least in theory, should guarantee 
good corporate governance: the annual general meeting (AGM). During the AGM, corporate executives 
address both shareholders and the financial markets. From a legal standpoint, the AGM constitutes a main 
corporate governance instrument that enables shareholders to limit the possibility of expropriation by 
managers. Certain decisions can only be approved at the AGM, for example, the election of the board of 
directors, and important managerial announcements, usually concerning managers’ views about the company’s 
prospects, are often made there. Stratling (2003) defines the following main functions of the AGM: (1) to 
inform shareholders about the company’s financial results and major business decisions that have been made; 
(2) to obtain shareholders’ approval of the decisions that do not rely on the managerial discretion of the board; 
and (3) to provide a forum for discussion between managers and shareholders on the past performance of the 
company and its future actions and prospects. Two of these functions involve the transmission of relevant 
information from managers to shareholders. Even more precisely, Olibe (2002), analysing U.K.-based firms 
listed in the U.S. market, points out three important reasons that the AGM is likely to provide information to 
the market: First, investors’ participation suggests to that these annual meetings provide information beyond 
preliminary earnings announcements and annual reports and accounts. Second, if the U.K. company law 
mandates the AGM, it is because data not available in previous financial reports are released during the AGM. 
Third, managers often provide more qualitative and forward-looking information during the AGM. 
There are four lines of research that address the AGM (Catasús 2007, p. 169): (1) studies that examine 
the informational content of the AGM; (2) the relation of the AGM to corporate governance issues, like voting 
practices and participation at the event; (3) critical historical analysis of specific events that occurred at an 
AGM; and (4) sociological theories to consider the meetings between investors and managers. While 
conclusions regarding the second line of research tend to find the AGM to be an ineffective monitoring 
management tool for minority shareholders, and therefore dispensable (Stratling 2003), we cannot propose to 
abolish these meetings based only on this approach. There is, at least one value-relevant function of the AGM 
that deserves to be analysed in depth: the informational content of the AGM and the international differences 
across countries. Our research analyses the AGM and its informational content in countries with different legal 
traditions, extending the existing literature that follows the first line of research. 
We found only a few articles addressing the information contents of the AGM; with only one exception, 
all focused on companies listed in common-law stock markets. Firth (1981) conducted research with a sample 
of 120 companies listed on the U.K. stock market using weekly data. He fails to report abnormal stock price or 
trading volume behaviour around AGM dates, therefore concluding that these meetings do not seem to provide 
higher levels of information. Nevertheless, since he uses weekly data, he cannot properly determine the 
response of the market, which normally lasts for some days, and it is also difficult to compare his results with 
subsequent research. Some years later, Brickley (1985) carried out his research with a random sample of 100 
firms listed with the Center for Research in Security Prices for the period 1978–82 to analyse stock return 
behaviour around the event. Using daily data, he finds positive and statistically significant abnormal returns 
around shareholder meetings, suggesting that AGMs often contain important managerial announcements. 
Brickley explains this result based on the risk and return trade-off around predictable events developed by 
Kalay and Loewestein (1985). 
Ten years later, Rippington and Taffler (1995) tested the information content of four types of corporate-
relevant events, one of them being the AGM. The sample includes 337 U.K. companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. They find only a small price reaction to AGMs, thus concluding that AGMs seem to convey 
little relevant information to the market. 
Finally, Olibe (2002) addresses the effects of AGMs on absolute and squared returns, as well as trading 
values, with a sample of 227 firms registered in the U.K. whose shares are traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). His results show significant price changes for 
both absolute and squared returns, as well as abnormal trading volumes. Nevertheless, he only performs the 
parametric t-test, and the significance of trading volumes is not robust in terms of the way volumes are defined. 
He also warns about the lack of generalisation of his results to other stock markets. 
Summarising the above-listed studies, Rippington and Taffler (1995), analysing the change in returns, 
and Olibe (2002), focusing on the change in volatility, find a weak reaction of stock prices to AGMs in the 
U.K., while Brickley (1985) shows evidence of abnormal returns around AGMs in the U.S. (he does not take 
into account trading volumes or volatility). Firth (1981) reports no evidence of abnormal returns using weekly 
data. Regarding trading volumes, only Firth (1981) and Olibe (2002) address the issue, with contradictory 
results. As can be seen, the studies developed in common-law countries have followed different approaches to 
assess the informational content of the event. 
On the other hand, the first investigation of the issue in a civil-law country is found in the work of 
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Garcia-Blandon et al. (2011, 2012), who use daily data and two different methodologies to assess the 
informational content of the AGM in Spain. Both methodologies show that AGMs have no significant effects 
on returns, volatility, or trading volumes, indicating that no relevant information is released to the financial 
market during these meetings. 
To assess the informational content of the AGM in common- and civil-law countries, we empirically 
test whether there are differences in the AGM’s impact on returns, returns volatility, and trading volumes in a 
sample of common- and civil-law countries. Abnormal price changes (Beaver 1968) and trading volumes (Kim 
and Verrecchia 1991) are investors’ responses to disclosure information; thus, we expect abnormal price 
changes and trading volumes whenever the AGM translates new information to the financial markets. We have 
found that common-law countries share a quite similar level of information disclosure during the AGM, 
while national idiosyncratic characteristics among the civil-law countries would explains its despair 
reactions. 
 
This paper contributes to the extant research in international corporate governance in two different 
ways: First, we update and contrast the results found in Brickley (1985), Rippington and Taffler (1995), and 
Olibe (2002) for companies belonging to the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange (FTSE) All-Share Index. We have investigated the behaviour of returns, returns volatility, and 
trading volumes for both samples around AGM dates. Second, we address the release of value-relevant 
information during AGMs for the first time in France, Germany, and Japan, all of which are civil-law 
countries. Since La Porta et al. (1998) pointed out the importance of a country’s legal tradition on corporate 
governance issues, we cannot assume on a prior basis that results obtained in countries whose legal tradition is 
based on the common law, like the U.K. and the U.S., can be directly extrapolated to other countries. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we present our theoretical framework to 
explain the influence of the country’s legal tradition on the information relevance of AGMs. In section 3, we 
discuss our methodology and dataset. Finally, results and conclusions are presented and discussed in sections 4 
and 5, respectively. 
 
2. The role of a country’s legal tradition 
 
While the traditional classification of financial and corporate governance systems is based on the 
institutions’ financing firms, La Porta et al. (2000, p. 19) state, ‘[…] bank- versus market-centeredness is not 
an especially useful way to distinguish financial systems’. In a previous, and perhaps the most referenced, 
paper on corporate governance (Richart et al. 2011), La Porta et al. (1998) propose an alternative to the 
traditional classification based on the legal origin of the countries, the so-called law and finance point of view. 
The authors analyse 49 mainly developed countries and classify them into two main categories – common-law 
and civil-law countries – concluding that the former are more effective at protecting outside investors than the 
latter. Subsequent research has shown that the influence of the legal origin is a valid explanation for financial 
and accounting differences across countries. As an example, Ball et al. (2000) report that economic losses are 
more likely to be recognised in the company financial statements in common-law than in civil-law countries. 
La Porta et al. (2003) show that countries with a French legal origin tend to have relatively weak liability rules 
as well as weak information disclosure requirements. 
La Porta et al. (1998) not only classify countries into common-law and civil-law groups but also 
establish three different civil-law subgroups: German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, and French civil law. 
They conclude that common-law countries are more effective at protecting outside investors than civil-law 
countries, but that French-civil-law countries have the weakest levels of protection and law enforcement, while 
German and Scandinavian countries fall in between. In fact, the fundamental basis of their argument is 
precisely that the differences in investor protection determine how the firm is financed and its ownership 
structure. They also note that ownership concentration is negatively related to the level of investor protection. 
While, for example, the three largest shareholders concentrate on average 20% of the ownership of public 
companies in the U.S. and 19% in the U.K., civil-law countries such as France (34%), Italy (58%), and Spain 
(51%) show much higher levels of ownership concentration. There are several types of ownership 
concentration, too: Whereas in Germany, banks often take control of corporations through equity holdings and 
proxy voting mechanisms, family control can be found in many developed countries, including Italy. In Spain, 
firms and state-owned companies control large companies, whereas individuals and families control medium-
sized firms (Leech and Manjón 2002). Japan can be seen as having a special case of ownership, somewhat 
close to that of Germany. It is known as keiretsu, a system consisting of a network of corporations with cross-
holdings around a major bank. Generally speaking, ownership concentration reduces agency problems, but 
managers and majority stockholders tend to expropriate minority stockholders’ wealth (the so-called 
“principal-principal” problem). We understand that the AGM can be used not only to control managers to 
expropriate shareholders’ wealth but also to control for the principal-principal problem. 
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The study of Venkataraman et al. (2008) on initial public offerings shows that audit quality is higher in 
common-law than in civil-law countries, because a stronger demand for high-quality audit reports exists in the 
former. Finally, DeFond et al. (2007), after analysing the information content of annual earnings 
announcements in 26 countries, conclude that this content is higher in common-law than in civil-law countries. 
From this evidence we, therefore, conclude that the quality of audit reports and the content of earnings 
announcements are lower in civil-law than in common-law countries, as a result of a lower demand for quality 
information in the former. Similarly, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) show that the quality of firms’ financial 
reports depends on the existing demand for quality reports. 
Therefore, the demand for quality information is not independent of a country’s legal tradition. We 
understand that the incremental information provided during the AGM directly depends on the information 
available before the meeting. In that sense, the more information that is available, the lower the informational 
impact of the meeting. The main source of information for stockholders prior to the AGM is the notice of 
convocation. The notice of convocation of the AGM is rather similar across countries in our sample. A 
standard notice sets the date, time, and location where the AGM will be held and the agenda of the meeting. 
The items in the agenda are also similar across countries, mainly consisting of the examination and approval of 
the unconsolidated and consolidated financial statements and audit reports, shareholder compensation, 
appointment or re-appointment of directors and compensation plans, and re-election of the auditors, among 
other issues. In addition, we can also find specific board of directors’ proposals that require shareholder 
approval. 
Additional information is usually attached to the notice of convocation and the agenda, and it is exactly 
here that the main differences among countries arise. For example, whereas the documents that must 
accompany the notice of an AGM of any listed company in the U.S. are extremely detailed (in both paper and 
Web access formats), the documentation required in France, Germany, or Spain is relatively sparse. U.S. 
companies must send before the AGM proxy materials and the annual report (regulation 14A of the 1934 Act). 
The same happens in the U.K., where the notice of the meeting must be accompanied by a copy of the annual 
accounts of the company, the director’s report on the position of the company for the year, and the auditor’s 
report on the accounts (Companies Act, 2006). 
On the other hand, civil-law countries, with the exception of Japan, provide information to shareholders 
by allowing them to examine the documents in the company’s registered office or to request that the company 
send them. In conclusion, we cannot find the same amount of information disclosure before the AGM or the 
same ease of access to it in civil-law countries. In the specific case of Japanese firms, they send a 
comprehensive dataset of information containing the date and length of meetings, the number of questions 
asked and the number of shareholders present; this is available for most publicly traded firms. Japan is closer 
to the common-law-country level of information disclosure prior to the AGM than that of a civil-law country. 
This is very much related to preventing sokaiya, corporate extortionists who disrupt meetings to blackmail 
management; this is done by holding short shareholders’ meetings (no more than 30 minutes) where the 
managers try to control any embarrassing situations that the shareholders may create with their questions to the 
board. At the same time, the government encourages all companies to hold their AGMs the same day and at the 
same time to spread the sokaiya manpower over numerous meetings (see table 3). In these circumstances, it is 
hard to assume that the managers of Japanese firms release any value-relevant information during these 
meetings. 
As said before, when information is released to the market, investors’ reaction can be seen in both price 
and trading volume changes. Market price changes represent overall market expectations (Beaver 1968), 
whereas trading volume reflects traders’ idiosyncratic preference to hold, sell, or buy the shares of a firm (Kim 
and Verrecchia 1991). Furthermore, high trading volumes around a company event would be associated with 
the release of new information (Kyle 1985). Accordingly, and following the Brown and Warner (1985) (BW) 
methodology, the null hypotheses have been posited: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In a civil- or common-law country, stock returns on the day of the AGM will not differ from 
those on ordinary days. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In a civil- or common-law country, volatility stock returns on the day of the AGM will not differ 
from those on ordinary days. 
 
Hypothesis 3: In a civil- or common-law country, the volume of shares traded on the day of the AGM will not 
differ from that on ordinary days. 
 
While the AGM agenda is almost the same for all the countries belonging to our sample, we would 
expect the incremental informational content of the AGM to be different in common-law and civil-law 
countries. In common-law countries, we could expect that, given the amount of information attached to the 
notice of convocation, the shareholder meeting reveals less additional value-relevant information than in civil-
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law countries, where shareholders have access to a small amount of information before the meeting, with the 
exception of Japan, where sokaiya prevention makes it difficult to transmit any relevant information to the 
financial market. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In subsections 3.1 and 3.2, we present the sample and dataset used in our research and the methodology 
we propose to address the informational content of the AGM. 
 
3.1 Sample and dataset 
 
To accomplish our goal, we examine abnormal stock prices and trading volumes around the AGM in 
France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S., from January 2005 to June 2010. Table 1 shows the 
stock index, number of companies, and events, on a country basis. We select all companies belonging to each 
country index with the exception of the FTSE All-Share Index. In that case, the 30 largest companies by 
market capitalisation in December 2010 form the sample to make the sample size and firm capitalisation 
characteristics comparable among countries. Table 2 reports the average summary statistics of financial and 
institutional variables corresponding to the analysed period by country. 
Daily trading data were obtained from the Thomson Reuters 3000 Xtra database, and information about 
the AGM dates was hand-collected from each country’s stock market regulatory organism, as a first approach. 
When the date of the AGM was missing in our primary source, it was obtained from the company’s corporate 
website. 
 
[Insert table 1] 
[Insert table 2] 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
We have followed the BW (1985) event study methodology to assess the information content of the 
AGM in countries with different legal traditions. 
We have tested the aggregate market’s average reaction to the information released by testing the 
change in price through two different measures: abnormal returns (ARs) and the absolute value of abnormal 
returns (AAAR). Additionally, we have tested the sum of all individual investors’ trades around AGM dates by 
analysing the change of trading volumes. The three indicators of the market reaction to the release of 
information have been tested individually for each country in our sample. 
We compute ARs as the difference between actual and normal returns, while normal returns are defined 
as the expected return without conditioning on the event. 
The return of security i over period t is defined as 
 
Rit = E Rit Xt( )it + ARit         [1] 
 
where Rit, E Rit Xt( )it , and ARit are the actual, normal, and abnormal returns, respectively. Xt is the 
conditioning information set for the normal return model. We compute expected or normal returns using the 
market model; thus, we assume that normal return is given by a linear relationship between the stock return 
and the market return: 
 
E Rit Xt( )it = ai + biRmt         [2] 
 
Rmt = ln
CountryIndext
CountryIndext−1






a and b estimated parameters
       [3] 
 
We estimate the security normal returns through a pre-event period of 151 days from day -170 to day -
20, with day 0 being the AGM day.  
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Given the nature of the event, it is meaningful to address the behaviour of prices and trading volumes 
before and after the AGM. Under insider trading, we should observe a market reaction before the AGM, while 
it could be also possible that the market reacts with a delay to the information released during the AGM. To 
capture these possible effects, we have not limited our research to the day of the event but have also examined 
an 11-day event window [-5, +5]. 
After estimating daily average abnormal returns (AARs) for each firm, the AAR for each country’s 
whole sample on day t (AARt) is calculated: 
 
 
AARt =
1
N
ARit
i=1
N
∑
         [4]
 
 
The t-statistic for AAR at any day in the event period is given by 
 
t − statistic = AARt
Sp
         [5] 
 
where pS  is the standard deviation of the AR over the pre-event period. 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is obtained by adding the average daily AR for 
different time intervals (a, b), within the event window [-5, +5]: 
 
CAAR= AARt
t=a
b
∑
         [6]
 
 
For each country sample, a large number of events have been studied. Unless all the companies 
experience the same positive or negative reaction to the AGM, positive and negative ARs would cancel each 
other out, which would imply that we would not be able to detect changes in prices. To avoid this problem, we 
also examine the stock price volatility around the AGM, measured as the AAAR, and then proceed in a manner 
similar to how we handled ARs. The only difference arises in how ARs are computed: when ARs are 
computed as absolute values, they cannot be directly used to perform a parametric test because the null 
hypothesis, that a sum of absolute values is zero, will be rejected. Therefore, we correct absolute returns by the 
mean value of the pre-event period. 
Following Menendez (2005), we define abnormal trading volumes for stock i on day t as 
 
AVit =
Vit
Vit + Vit
t=30
104
∑
t=−94
−20
∑





x
1
150
       [7] 
 
where Vit  is the traded volume in euros of stock i  on day t. 
As we did with returns, once abnormal daily volumes have been computed for each firm, the average 
abnormal trading volume (AAV) on day t is calculated as 
 
AAVi =
1
N
AVit
i=1
N
∑ −1          [8] 
 
The t-statistic for AAV is given by 
 
t − statistic = AAVt
Sp
         [9]
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The cumulative average abnormal volume (CAAV) is obtained by adding average daily abnormal 
volumes across different time intervals (a, b), within the event window [-5, +5]: 
 
CAAV = AAVt
t=a
b
∑
         [10]
 
 
The three null hypotheses are tested through both parametric and non-parametric tests. For the 
parametric test, BW methodology is followed. Additionally, we have performed Corrado’s (1989) non-
parametric rank test. To implement the rank test, we first transform each firm’s AR in ranks (Ki) over the 
combined period, including the estimation and the event window (Ti). 
 
Kil = rank ARil( )          [11] 
ARil > ARis ⇒ Kil > Kis         [12] 
      
The test compares the ranks in the event period for each firm, with the expected average rank under the 
null hypothesis of no ARs. The test statistic for the null hypothesis is: 
 
R=
1
N
(Ki 0 − Ki )
i=1
N
∑
S(K )         [13] 
where 
 
S(K) = 1
T
1
N2t=1
T
∑ (K it − K i )
i=1
N
∑
2
      [14] 
 
In BW (1985), the authors conducted simulated event studies and concluded that estimates from 
ordinary least squares with a market index tested with parametric statistical tests were well specified with 
random samples. Ahern (2009) conducted simulations of event studies with samples grouped by size, prior 
returns, and book-to-market and earning-to-price ratios, concluding that standard event study methods produce 
statistical biases in grouped samples. Moreover, he points out that ‘the power of the t-test to detect abnormal 
performance is lower than the non-parametric tests and displays considerable bias’ (Ahern 2009, p. 480). In 
our research, although both tests are performed, since we are analysing a grouped sample with a likely size 
effect on the results, we give more credit to the results reported by the non-parametric test. 
Time independency is a key factor in event studies. It is well known that event studies are predisposed 
to cross-sectional correlation among ARs when the event day is the same for all the firms in the sample. This 
situation is defined as clustering, and it causes serious over-rejection of the null hypothesis (Kolari and 
Pynnonen 2010). Table 3 shows the distribution of AGM dates from 2005 to 2010 in Japan. As an example, 
80% of the AGMs took place in only four days in 2009 and 2010. Therefore, since time independency is 
clearly rejected in Japan, the t-test would be misspecified. As suggested by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) for 
situations involving clustering, Corrado and Zivney’s (1992) non-parametric test has been applied in the 
specific case of Japan. 
 
[Insert table 3] 
 
We have tested the robustness of our results by constructing AR and AV final panels applying both the average 
and the median. Only a very small number of significance values change by applying the median, and they do 
not affect any main result that could change our conclusions. The results shown in the next section are based 
on average values. 
 
4. Results 
 
Results are presented in six tables, one per country, following the same structure. Each table is divided 
into three panels showing AAR (panel 1), AAAR (panel 2), and AAV (panel 3) results and significance levels 
for both the t-statistic and Corrado test. 
The bottom of each table shows cumulative results for four distinct periods. Thus, accumulated results 
are presented considering the day of the event as well as previous days in the window [-5, 0], one day before [-
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1, 0], one day after [0, 1], and the post-event [0, +5] accumulated effect. The first period analysed measures 
whether there is leakage of information prior to the AGM, the last determines the delayed reaction in time, and 
the second and the third, very common in the literature, reflect a very short-term anticipated or delayed 
reaction to the AGM. 
Results are by group, taking into account the countries’ legal traditions, as seen in section 2. 
 
4.1 Stock prices and trading volumes around the AGM in common-law countries 
 
Tables 4 and 5 summarise the results for the U.K. and U.S. samples, respectively.  
 
[Insert table 4] 
[Insert table 5] 
 
For the shareholders’ meeting date, the parametric and non-parametric tests show no evidence of price 
changes in both measures for the U.K. and U.S. samples for the event window days. Thus, the AGM does not 
affect returns or returns volatility, and the two null hypotheses cannot be rejected in our common-law subset of 
countries. The same result applies to changes in prices before the AGM, characterised by no significant 
abnormal results. The main conclusion regarding ARs and AAARs is that market expectations do not change 
because of shareholders’ meetings; thus, the AGM does not seem to provide relevant information to the 
financial market in these two common-law countries. These findings are in line with Firth’s (1981) results and 
do not directly contradict Rippington and Taffler’s (1995) and Olibe’s (2002) main conclusions for the U.K. 
that shareholders’ meetings convey little information to the market. On the other hand, our results partially 
contradict the findings of Brickley (1985), whose work was the only research supporting a clear effect of the 
AGM on stock prices in the U.S. Although we are comparing our results with previous research, we have to be 
cautious since the companies examined in the references cited were operating in a totally different information 
environment, thus limiting the comparability of results. 
For the multi-day tests, CAAR is statistically significant for the sub-periods [-5, 0] and [-1, 0] for the 
U.S. sample, indicating a negative market reaction prior to the AGM. Cumulative average absolute value of 
abnormal return (CAAAR) [-1, 0] is also significant for the U.K. sample with the Corrado test indicating an 
increase in volatility. Given that we cannot find a significant CAAR for the same sub-period, the increase in 
volatility indicates that the U.K. market finds the event informative but does not interpret the information 
equally. It is worth mentioning that CAAR for [-1, 0] in the U.K. is also negative, although not significant. 
These results indicate that although there is not an aggregate market reaction on a day-by-day basis, the 
AGM provided some information to the market in the U.S. and the U.K., since the period [-1, 0] shows a 
significant change in prices. 
For the day-by-day analysis, panel 3 provides evidence of significant above-average trading activity on 
AGM days for both the U.K. and U.S. samples, which means that the third null hypothesis has to be rejected. 
Moreover, we observe significantly abnormal trading volumes on t = -1 and t = -5 for the U.K. and on t = -3 
and t = -4 for the U.S., which can be understood as an anticipated response to the AGM. When trading 
response is accumulated across days, the evidence of higher trading volumes is sustained in each of the four 
sub-periods studied. It is worth noting that abnormal trading volumes, on a day-by-day basis, are always 
positive within the event window. In these two common-law countries, our analysis suggests that investors 
review their beliefs after the AGM. 
Accordingly, they take actions resulting in abnormal and statistically significant trading volumes. In the 
specific case of the U.S., the negative sign in CAAR indicates that they agree about selling their stocks, 
whereas in the U.K., CAAAR indicates that they do not agree about selling or buying. 
 
4.2 Stock prices and trading volumes around the AGM in civil-law countries 
 
As shown in section 2, a close relation exists between investor protection and information quality; 
hence, we show the results for Germany, Japan, France, and Spain in pairs. 
First, we discuss the price and volume response results for Germany and Japan, both countries 
belonging to the German-civil-law subgroup. Next, results are provided for France and Spain, as they belong to 
the French-civil-law subgroup. 
 
4.2.1 Germany and Japan 
 
Following our results in table 6 (panels 1 and 2), we reject null hypotheses 1 and 2 of price changes 
around the AGM in the German stock market. These hypotheses are rejected through both parametric and non-
parametric tests. Our results show not only positive and significant price changes on the day of the AGM but 
also a serious correction the day after, with a significant increase in volatility and a negative AR on t = +1. The 
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return reaction lasts for several days and the multi-day CAAR [0, +5] is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting a financial market overreaction to the information released during the AGM and a subsequent 
correction after the meeting. The behaviour of CAAAR also indicates a significant increase in returns volatility 
during the periods [0, +1] and [0, +5].  
Panels 1 and 2 in table 7 present AAR and AAAR around AGM dates in Japan. As can be seen, the 
Corrado test does not support a significant reaction of stock prices to the AGM; thus, the two null hypotheses 
concerning price changes cannot be rejected for the Japanese stock market. The AGM does not seem to 
convey, on average, any value-relevant information to the financial market. Table 7 also reports significantly 
lower levels of volatility after the AGM, thus supporting the lack of relevant information releases during 
shareholder meetings. It is worth noting that this result is reported for each day within the event window. The 
lack of any informational effect in the Japanese market lasts for several days, as detected by CAAAR, showing 
significant and lower-than-average levels of volatility. This result is consistent with sokaiya preventions taken 
by corporate managers in Japan.  
It is interesting to compare our results for Germany and Japan. Although both countries belong to the 
same group in La Porta et al.’s (1998) classification scheme, our results regarding AAR and AAAR for the two 
countries have very little in common. The fact that we report an average market reaction to the AGM in 
Germany but not in Japan emphasises the relevance of institutional issues in addition to a country’s legal 
tradition.  
 
[Insert table 6] 
[Insert table 7]  
 
Trading volumes around AGM dates in Germany and Japan are reported in panel 3 of tables 6 and 7. As 
was the case with stock prices, trading volumes around AGM dates show quite different behaviours in the two 
countries. Shareholder meetings do not seem to have any effect on stock trading volumes in Japan, where the 
results show systematic, although not significant, lower-than-average trading activity for each day within the 
event window. Consequently, null hypothesis 3, stating that trading volumes will not be affected by the AGM, 
cannot be rejected for Japan. Although a day-by-day analysis does not detect any significant change in trading 
volumes, CAAV is significant and lower than average for three sub-periods analysed: before, around, and after 
the AGM day. 
Conversely, results for the German market show large and statistically significant trading volumes for 
six out of seven days within sub-period [-5, +1]. Therefore, null hypothesis 3 concerning trading volumes is 
rejected for Germany. 
We conclude that investors seem to adjust their investment portfolio decisions before, during, and after 
the AGM in Germany. We can also say that the AGM does not fulfil their expectations because before and 
during the meeting we obtain positive ARs, which are corrected with a very strong negative reaction after the 
meeting. Our results indicate that relevant information, as expected, is transmitted to the financial market 
during the AGM in Germany.  The increase in law enforcement to protect investors in Germany, where its 
managers face a wide scope of criminal sanctions, maximum fines, and prison terms, compared with other 
civil-law and even common-law countries, may explain a part of it (Djankow et al. 2008). 
 
4.2.2 France and Spain 
 
Changes in stock prices in France and Spain are reported in tables 8 and 9 (panels 1 and 2), 
respectively. Neither AAR nor AAAR on AGM dates is statistically significant in either of the two markets. 
Thus, neither of the two null hypotheses regarding price changes can be rejected for France or Spain. Although 
both countries show the same results regarding the day of the AGM, this is not the case for the days around the 
AGM. On the one hand, in the French sample, we cannot find any price anticipation of the meeting, whereas in 
the Spanish sample, we detect positive and statistically significant ARs on t = -3 and t = -1, and negative 
significant abnormal volatility on t = -3. On the other hand, a delayed reaction of stock prices to the AGM is 
reported in France, where negative and statistically significant ARs are observed on t = +2, t = +4, and t = +5, 
with above-average volatility on t = +2 and t = +5. Such behaviour is not observed in the Spanish market, 
where stock prices do not show any particular behaviour on days after the AGM. The analysis of cumulative 
ARs reinforces our previous conclusion. 
 
[Insert table 8] 
[Insert table 9] 
 
The analysis of trading volumes in France confirms above-average trading activity on the day of the 
AGM and the day after. The t-statistic and the Corrado test provide similar results. These results are extendible 
to days t = +4 and t = +5, indicating that the increase in trading volumes induced by the AGM lasts for several 
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days. Therefore, the null hypothesis that states that trading volumes are not affected by the AGM is rejected in 
the French case. Regarding the Spanish market, the t-statistic and the Corrado test lead to contradictory results. 
Based on the t-statistic, trading volume on the day of the AGM is positive and statistically significant, although 
this result is not supported by the Corrado test. As discussed in the methodology section, the Corrado test 
performs better than the t-statistic when a sample is not randomly selected; thus, we finally conclude that the 
AGM in Spain does not affect trading volumes. Therefore, we cannot reject the third null hypothesis in Spain. 
These results are in line with previous investigations (Garcia-Blandon et al. 2012) that find no abnormal 
trading activity in Spain during the AGM. Abnormal trading volume is detected on days t = +2 and t = +5, 
confirmed by the t-statistic and the Corrado test, as a late reaction to the information released during the 
meeting.  
We conclude that no relevant information is given to the overall market during the AGM in Spain, 
supporting the lack of information content of this corporate event. We can point out a plausible explanation 
based on ownership structure in Spain. As it is quite concentrated, it makes it easier for managers to 
communicate with the most important shareholders, leaving out the event from any relevant content. 
Table 10 reports a summary of three indicators of the market reaction to the information released during 
the AGM. As can be appreciated, the U.K. and the U.S. show identical reactions, while the civil-law countries 
exhibit very different behaviours. In fact, the financial market in France shows a reaction identical to that of 
the U.K. and the U.S., and it is not comparable to any other country within the civil-law group. Spain and 
Japan show no reaction to the AGM, but the most jarring case is that of Germany, whose reaction is not 
comparable to any of the countries analysed. 
 
[Insert table 10] 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The main goal of this paper has been to analyse whether the informational content of the AGM depends 
on a country’s legal tradition. Following our results, this question has a partial positive answer. The two 
common-law countries in our sample, the U.S. and the U.K., show very similar reactions to the AGM for 
returns, returns volatility, and trading volumes. Returns and volatility do not seem to be affected by the AGM, 
thus indicating that no relevant information for the overall market is released during these meetings. 
Nevertheless, we observe a significant increase in the number of shares traded before and on AGM dates, 
therefore suggesting that these meetings are not irrelevant for individual investors. The lack of reaction of 
stock prices to the AGM contradicts most of the evidence available for the two countries, showing a moderate 
effect of the AGM on stock prices. In our opinion, the dilution of the AGM effects in recent times is due to the 
fact that both the quantity and the quality of the information publicly available are much higher than they were 
several decades ago. Therefore, the marginal informational content of the AGM is not on average relevant for 
the market. 
Contrary to our expectations, we have found that we cannot generalise the AGM as an informative 
event in civil-law countries as we do for the U.S. and the U.K. Our results emphasise the role of national 
idiosyncratic characteristics beyond legal tradition on the information transmitted during the AGM within the 
civil-law group of countries. The effects of the AGM on the behaviour of stocks importantly differ across 
countries, being particularly distinctive in Germany, which is the only civil-law country where our 
expectations are fulfilled. German stocks are characterised by a dramatic change in stock prices and volume 
traded on the day of the AGM, suggesting that relevant information is transmitted for the overall market and 
for individual investors. In the French market, our expectations are fulfilled only partially because the AGM 
only transmits relevant information for individual investors. As information available before the AGM is 
sparse, we shall assume that the information transmitted during the meeting is already known, somehow, by 
the overall market, or is irrelevant. On the other hand, we do not observe any reaction in Japan and Spain. 
Although the lack of reaction was expected in the former, where the AGM is clearly a dispensable tool as a 
source of information, the latter results are quite surprising. In Japan, the information available before the 
meeting is extensive and detailed, and thus we understand that the lack of information during the meeting is 
not the ideal situation but is less harmful to investors. However, Spain shows a very low level of information 
disclosure before and during the meeting, which indicates this is not a source of relevant information. From our 
point of view, this is the worst possible situation, with no information transmitted during the meeting.  
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Table 1 This table presents the stock indexes, number of companies, and events per country in our sample. 
 
Country Stock Index Number of 
companies 
Number of events 
France CAC40 40 234 
Germany DAX30 30 180 
Japan Nikkei 30 176 
Spain IBEX35 35 198 
U.K. FTSE All-Share 30 180 
U.S. DJIA 30 180 
Total  195 1,148 
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Table 2 This table reports the average summary statistics for the six years period analysed, unless for growth in 
revenues.  
Market capitalization, Revenues and EBITDA are expressed in millions of US dollars 
Growth in revenues is estimated as the geometrical average of the past three years historical growth in 
revenues. 
ROE=Return on Equity. Estimated by dividing the Net Income by the book value of Equity. 
ROC=Return on Capital. Estimated by dividing After Tax Operating Income by the book value of previous 
year invested capital. 
Institutional holding=Percentage of outstanding shares being held by mutual funds, pension funds and trusts.  
 
Minimum Median Mean Maximum Stand.dev. 
  France 
Market Capitalization  5,279.05 28,280.00 39,083.90 204,632.50 34,289.39 
Revenues  698.97 24,511.70 39,180.34 224,035.50 38,356.96 
EBITDA  130.48 3,951.35 6,128.91 46,900.00 7,369.72 
Growth in revenues (2009-2010) -0.13 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.07 
ROE -0.47 0.13 0.12 0.49 0.12 
ROC -0.11 0.12 0.14 0.97 0.12 
Institutional holding (2009-2010) 0.04 0.35 0.35 0.67 0.14 
  Germany 
Market Capitalization 6,027.60 24,075.41 36,442.18 156,449.40 28,317.79 
Revenues  1,955.51 33,821.49 48,685.08 207,490.36 44,699.72 
EBITDA  -191.60 3,643.60 6,011.02 28,266.60 6,150.25 
Growth in revenues (2009-2010) -0.12 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.07 
ROE -1.76 0.12 0.12 0.42 0.18 
ROC -0.18 0.10 0.14 1.12 0.16 
Institutional holding (2009-2010) 0.07 0.36 0.37 0.65 0.13 
  Japan 
Market Capitalization 15,868.80 33,226.11 45,428.56 240,099.20 34,301.28 
Revenues  2,711.10 36,566.47 47,292.54 207,484.80 37,982.60 
EBITDA  226.70 5,709.88 7,498.64 33,576.80 6,686.56 
Growth in revenues (2009-2010) -0.15 -0.04 -0.03 0.16 0.06 
ROE -0.45 0.10 0.09 0.43 0.10 
ROC -0.08 0.07 0.10 0.50 0.10 
Institutional holding (2009-2010) 0.08 0.23 0.26 0.67 0.12 
  Spain 
Market Capitalization 220.00 8,360.83 21,008.89 160,930.10 30,009.31 
Revenues  30.70 5,285.67 12,964.67 83,325.60 17,916.08 
EBITDA  -275.60 1,005.59 2,852.37 32,098.90 5,239.50 
Growth in revenues (2009-2010) -0.17 0.05 0.08 1.30 0.21 
ROE -0.17 0.18 0.20 0.66 0.12 
ROC -0.17 0.08 0.11 0.68 0.12 
Institutional holding (2009-2010) 0.01 0.25 0.26 0.92 0.19 
  U.S. 
Market Capitalization 7,515.00 110,952.00 124,215.72 511,719.20 88,637.21 
Revenues  18,439.00 51,210.00 85,570.64 425,071.00 90,874.17 
EBITDA  359.00 11,505.10 22,220.49 111,115.00 22,710.74 
Growth in revenues -0.44 0.08 0.07 0.69 0.14 
ROE -0.08 0.20 0.23 1.20 0.15 
ROC -0.05 0.17 0.24 1.91 0.26 
Institutional holding (2009-2010) 0.13 0.65 0.65 0.86 0.11 
 U.K. 
Market Capitalization 6,341.19 48,794.52 65,949.39 224,674.40 55,441.83 
Revenues  2,962.60 30,906.10 49,111.63 524,657.44 79,643.86 
EBITDA  -2,640.10 5,991.72 10,355.17 71,645.94 12,572.37 
Growth in revenues (2009-2010) -0.53 0.09 0.08 0.67 0.17 
ROE -0.44 0.25 0.30 1.00 0.25 
ROC -0.70 0.17 0.21 1.02 0.22 
  16 
Institutional holding (2009-2010) 0.03 0.38 0.37 0.63 0.14 
Source: Bloomberg, Capital IQ and Value Line 
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Table 3 This table shows the AGM distribution dates in Japan from 2005 to 2010 to illustrate how the AGM 
celebration dates are coincident around the 20th and 29th of June. 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
27-Mar         1   1 
28-Mar       1     1 
29-Mar     1       1 
30-Mar 1 1       1 3 
22-May       1     1 
24-May     1       1 
25-May   1         1 
27-May           1 1 
28-May         1   1 
15-Jun   1         1 
17-Jun           1 1 
18-Jun         1 1 2 
19-Jun       1 1   2 
20-Jun     2 2     4 
21-Jun 1   1       2 
22-Jun 3 1 7     1 12 
23-Jun 2 7   1 6 5 21 
24-Jun 6     6 9 7 28 
25-Jun 1   3 8 4 5 21 
26-Jun     5 4 5   14 
27-Jun   6 2 5 1   14 
28-Jun 5 7 7 1   1 21 
29-Jun 7 6 1   1 7 22 
Total 26 30 30 30 30 30  
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Table 4 This table summarizes daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal 
trading volumes around annual general meeting dates in the U.K. It also shows cumulative results at the 
bottom. Superscript *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AAR t-stat   Corrado   AAAR t-stat   Corrado   AAV t-stat   Corrado   
-5 -0.0008 -0.4533  -0.7523  0.0010 0.8461  0.4191  0.1815 2.3463 * 1.9818 * 
-4 0.0011 0.6174  0.4594  -0.0011 -0.8825  -0.9564  0.1252 1.6184  1.3257   
-3 -0.0010 -0.5827  -1.0851  -0.0007 -0.5445  0.1284  0.0957 1.2374  1.3635   
-2 0.0011 0.6156  0.6872  -0.0002 -0.1249  0.3718  0.1028 1.3292  1.3034   
-1 -0.0003 -0.1736  -0.6800  0.0009 0.7080  1.5411  0.1992 2.5746 * 2.5513 * 
0 -0.0014 -0.7716   -1.7760   0.0014 1.1174   1.6628   0.3241 4.1887 * 2.7470 * 
1 0.0001 0.0365  -0.1555  -0.0010 -0.8050  -0.6928  0.1475 1.9069  1.5881   
2 0.0006 0.3539  0.4594  0.0006 0.4958  0.2433  0.0726 0.9381  0.7985   
3 -0.0001 -0.0322  -0.5136  -0.0005 -0.4209  0.1893  0.0353 0.4566  0.1268   
4 -0.0006 -0.3313  -0.2098  -0.0008 -0.6123  -0.7097  0.0692 0.8945  0.9720   
5 0.0011 0.6087   0.1302   0.0004 0.2934   0.7030   0.0662 0.8561   0.4026   
[-5,0] -0.0013 -0.3055  -1.2847   0.0014 0.4570   0.6788   1.0286 5.4275 ** 4.6020 ** 
[-1,0] -0.0017 -0.6684  -1.7366   0.0023 1.2907  2.2655 * 0.5233 4.7824 ** 3.7464 ** 
[0,1] -0.0013 -0.5198  -1.3658   0.0004 0.2209  0.6859   0.4716 4.3103 ** 3.0654 ** 
[0,5] -0.0002 -0.0556   -0.8432   0.0001 0.0279   0.5698   0.7150 3.7726 ** 2.7087 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  19 
 
Table 5 This table summarizes daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal 
trading volumes around annual general meeting dates in the U.S. It also shows cumulative results at the 
bottom. Superscript *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AAR t-stat   Corrado   AAAR t-stat   Corrado   AAV t-stat   Corrado   
-5 -0.0028 -2.5928 ** -1.5718  0.0014 1.5384  0.4240  0.1069 1.7432  1.1813   
-4 0.0005 0.4482  0.6045  0.0005 0.5373  0.8023  0.1407 2.2929 * 2.0373 * 
-3 -0.0002 -0.1798  -0.4250  0.0004 0.4561  1.0647  0.1531 2.4962 * 2.2648 * 
-2 -0.0010 -0.8971  -1.5132  -0.0006 -0.6203  -0.0397  0.0611 0.9957  0.7682   
-1 -0.0001 -0.1209  -1.1395  0.0005 0.5552  -0.0915  0.0695 1.1322  0.9837   
0 -0.0013 -1.2234   -1.8833   0.0001 0.0803   0.5796   0.1127 1.8368   1.9794 * 
1 0.0011 1.0609  0.5899  -0.0006 -0.6308  -0.0092  0.0726 1.1838  1.5664   
2 0.0018 1.6634  1.8576  -0.0009 -0.9489  -0.7077  0.1067 1.7388  1.4586   
3 0.0015 1.3733  0.8390  -0.0007 -0.7440  -1.0403  0.0517 0.8423  0.8540   
4 -0.0006 -0.5432  -0.9270  -0.0009 -1.0271  -1.0250  0.0094 0.1533  0.3153   
5 0.0016 1.4933   1.3666   0.0001 0.0697   -0.5796   0.0283 0.4611   0.3392   
[-5,0] -0.0049 -1.8640  -2.4202 * 0.0024 1.0398   1.1184   0.6439 4.2854 ** 3.7619 ** 
[-1,0] -0.0014 -0.9506  -2.1374 * 0.0006 0.4494  0.3451   0.1821 2.0994 * 2.0953 * 
[0,1] -0.0002 -0.1149  -0.9145   -0.0005 -0.3892  0.4034   0.1853 2.1359 * 2.5072 * 
[0,5] 0.0041 1.5613   0.7524   -0.0030 -1.3067   -1.1358   0.3813 2.5377 * 2.6589 ** 
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Table 6 This table summarizes daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal 
trading volumes around annual general meeting dates in Germany. It also shows cumulative results at the 
bottom. Superscript *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AAR t-stat   Corrado   AAAR t-stat   Corrado   AAV t-stat   Corrado   
-5 -0.0005 -0.3503   -0.2976  0.0008 0.5878  0.7326  0.1637 2.6705 ** 2.1687 * 
-4 0.0007 0.4646  0.4118  0.0001 0.0721  0.4901  0.1904 3.1075 ** 2.3007 * 
-3 0.0031 2.2010 * 2.0319 * 0.0000 -0.0290  0.0053  0.0657 1.0714  1.1341   
-2 0.0007 0.4795  0.6853  0.0031 2.2704 * 1.0620  0.2144 3.4981 ** 2.1211 * 
-1 0.0003 0.1953  0.4929  -0.0006 -0.4239  -0.1133  0.5782 9.4345 ** 4.1102 ** 
0 0.0048 3.4389 ** 2.3325 * 0.0034 2.5163 * 2.1529 * 1.1950 19.4978 ** 4.4522 ** 
1 -0.0224 -15.9983 ** -6.7660 ** 0.0162 11.9618 ** 5.9660 ** 0.4048 6.6049 ** 3.7985 ** 
2 -0.0013 -0.9423  -0.9228  -0.0010 -0.7351  -0.0949  0.0701 1.1432  0.9632   
3 0.0000 0.0161  -0.1052  -0.0010 -0.7735  -0.9961  0.0872 1.4224  1.0627   
4 -0.0015 -1.0933  -1.3376  -0.0008 -0.6096  -0.1766  0.1135 1.8521  1.5497   
5 -0.0019 -1.3507   -0.8476   -0.0008 -0.5654   -0.8301   0.0560 0.9140   0.7813   
-5,0 0.0090 2.6247 ** 2.3094 * 0.0068 2.0387 * 1.7675   2.4074 16.0359 ** 6.6492 ** 
-1,0 0.0051 2.5698 * 1.9979 * 0.0028 1.4796  0.9734   1.7732 20.4582 ** 6.0545 ** 
0,1 -0.0176 -8.8808 ** -3.1350 ** 0.0196 10.2375 ** 5.7409 ** 1.5998 18.4574 ** 5.8341 ** 
0,5 -0.0223 -6.5032 ** -3.1217 ** 0.0159 4.8151 ** 2.4582 ** 1.9265 12.8331 ** 5.1470 ** 
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Table 7 This table summarizes daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal 
trading volumes around annual general meeting dates in Japan. It also shows cumulative results at the bottom. 
Superscript *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
  Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AAR Corrado   AAAR Corrado   AAV Corrado   
-5 -0.0008 -0.5323  -0.0026 -1.5337  -0.1134 -1.0372   
-4 -0.0011 -0.8295  -0.0025 -1.2487  -0.1049 -1.2943   
-3 -0.0014 -1.2028  -0.0032 -1.8544  -0.1796 -1.9055   
-2 -0.0006 -0.3353  -0.0026 -1.5919  -0.1513 -1.5837   
-1 0.0000 0.1106  -0.0020 -1.0350  -0.1240 -1.2826   
0 0.0003 0.3007   -0.0031 -1.7156   -0.1441 -1.5441   
1 -0.0008 -0.5910  -0.0038 -2.1094 * -0.1105 -1.0269   
2 -0.0016 -1.5208  -0.0031 -1.7981  -0.1455 -1.6087   
3 0.0003 0.3353  -0.0038 -2.2594 * -0.1721 -1.8349   
4 0.0000 -0.1313  -0.0022 -1.1325  -0.1531 -1.5984   
5 0.0011 1.2443   -0.0035 -2.2575 * -0.1532 -1.5117   
-5,0 -0.0034 -1.0160   -0.0159 -3.6658 ** -0.8174 -3.5303 ** 
-1,0 0.0004 0.2908   -0.0050 -1.9450   -0.2681 -1.9987 * 
0,1 -0.0005 -0.2053   -0.0068 -2.7047 ** -0.2546 -1.8180   
0,5 -0.0006 -0.1482   -0.0195 -4.6020 ** -0.8786 -3.7252 ** 
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Table 8 This table summarizes daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal 
trading volumes around annual general meeting dates in France. It also shows cumulative results at the bottom. 
Superscript *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AAR t-stat   Corrado   AAAR t-stat   Corrado   AAV t-stat   Corrado   
-5 0.0022 1.4668   0.6694  0.0003 0.3069  -0.1812  0.0968 1.7142  1.4190   
-4 -0.0007 -0.4645  -1.3877  0.0012 1.0608  0.1032  0.0813 1.4393  0.1558   
-3 -0.0003 -0.2062  0.2340  -0.0007 -0.6058  -0.4531  0.0298 0.5284  -0.1390   
-2 0.0023 1.5452  0.8816  -0.0006 -0.5580  -0.7224  0.0718 1.2726  0.4458   
-1 -0.0009 -0.6001  -0.0980  -0.0012 -1.0931  -1.1578  0.1594 2.8229 ** 1.9176   
0 0.0008 0.5100   0.2694   0.0013 1.1819   1.2912   0.3108 5.5058 ** 3.6745 ** 
1 0.0010 0.6718  0.5633  0.0001 0.0559  0.2492  0.2179 3.8600 ** 2.6582 ** 
2 -0.0036 -2.4393 * -2.0299 * 0.0030 2.7680 ** 2.2577 * 0.1166 2.0662 * 1.4262   
3 -0.0009 -0.5926  -0.6068  -0.0007 -0.6545  -0.2341  0.2422 4.2902 ** 1.5221   
4 -0.0046 -3.1112 ** -3.0367 ** 0.0012 1.0966  0.7123  0.1477 2.6169 ** 2.2579 ** 
5 -0.0052 -3.4851 ** -3.5074 ** 0.0028 2.5540 * 2.5069 * 0.1681 2.9774 ** 2.5312 ** 
[-5,0] 0.0033 0.9190  0.2322   0.0003 0.1195   -0.4573   0.7499 5.4228 ** 3.0511 ** 
[-1,0] -0.0001 -0.0637  0.1212   0.0001 0.0628  0.0943   0.4702 5.8893 ** 3.9542 ** 
[0,1] 0.0017 0.8357  0.5888   0.0014 0.8753  1.0892   0.5287 6.6227 ** 4.4779 ** 
[0,5] -0.0125 -3.4482 ** -3.4081 ** 0.0077 2.8586 ** 2.7693 ** 1.2034 8.7025 ** 5.7441 ** 
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Table 9 This table summarizes daily average abnormal returns, absolute value abnormal returns, and abnormal 
trading volumes around annual general meeting dates in Spain. It also shows cumulative results at the bottom. 
Superscript *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 
Day AAR t-stat   Corrado   AAAR t-stat   Corrado   AAV t-stat   Corrado   
-5 0.0018 1.4494  1.7558   -0.0009 -1.0336   -0.8670   0.0776 1.3671   1.1533   
-4 0.0005 0.4397  0.3192   0.0001 0.1551  0.9227   0.1621 2.8571 * 1.5918   
-3 0.0018 1.4723  2.0783 *  -0.0022 -2.4923 * -2.3433 * 0.0501 0.8822  0.6482   
-2 -0.0001 -0.0898  0.6551   0.0003 0.3449  0.3954   0.0577 1.0172  0.7411   
-1 0.0019 1.5415  2.7301  ** 0.0002 0.2507  0.2197   0.1102 1.9416  1.5441   
0 0.0004 0.3088   0.3558   0.0008 0.8529   0.9227   0.1257 2.2148 * 1.3154   
1 0.0006 0.4460  0.0964   -0.0005 -0.5784  -0.7821   0.0716 1.2617  0.3527   
2 0.0005 0.4034  0.1663   0.0006 0.6457  0.4042   0.1681 2.9624 ** 2.1613 * 
3 -0.0016 -1.3105  -1.6693   0.0001 0.1565  0.4569   0.1026 1.8079  1.6133   
4 0.0007 0.5897  0.3226   0.0002 0.6606  0.9315   0.0891 1.5703  1.3368   
5 -0.0008 -0.6408   -0.0499   0.0008 0.5157   0.1845   0.1179 2.0781 * 2.3186 * 
[-5,0] 0.0064 2.0910 * 3.2229 ** -0.0017 -0.7848   -0.3061   0.5832 4.1968 ** 2.8553 ** 
[-1,0] 0.0023 1.0955  2.1821 * 0.0010 0.7804  0.8078   0.2358 2.9391 ** 2.0220 * 
[0,1] 0.0009 0.4469  0.3198   0.0002 0.1941  0.0994   0.1972 2.4583 * 1.1795   
[0,5] -0.0003 -0.0695   -0.3177   0.0020 0.9198   0.8646   0.6749 4.8562 ** 3.7143 ** 
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Table 10 Price and trading volume response the day of the AGM. 
 
AGM day U.K. U.S. Germany Japan France Spain 
Returns No response No response + No 
response 
No response No response 
Returns volatility No response No response + No 
response 
No response No response 
Trading Volume + + + No 
response 
+ No response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
